SCHLEY'S EXAMINATION ENDS

WITH A VOILEY OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS BY THE COURT.

estions Related to the Retrograft Movement, the Alleged Reconnetsance and the Matter of Coaling-Searching Questions by the Judge Advocate Regarding the "Reconnoissance" of May 81, the Brooklyn's Loop and the Battle of Santiago Schley Again Denies in Hodgson Colleguy.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 .- Admiral Schler's ordeal on the witness stand before the Court of Inquiry at the Washington Navy Yary ended to-day after a volley of searching questions by the court. These questions, coming as they did from the officers who will render findings and opinions as to American War and in the subsequent cor respondence with Lieutenant-Commander Albon C. Hodgson, were the most interest ing of the several hundred queries that have been directed at the commander of the Flying Squadron. By many of regarded as indicating the leaning of the court on certain matters, but this is too broad a supposition, as each question was prepared by an individual member, and tively, only one of the high ranking officers composing the investigating body is reible in each case for any sentiments that might appear to have been disclosed by the form in which the query was couched

Admiral Schley looked wearied when he left the stand this afternoon. The physical strain to which he has been subjected must have been tremendous and the mental anxiety of the three days of cross-examination must necessarily have told on him. He had been on the stand five days, and for the first two talked almost uously, relating the story of the Flying Squadron's experiences in Cuban waters. While he did not at any time to-day lose his remarkable self-control he occasionally showed signs of perturbation or vexation, gesticulating with both hands and abandoning his usual easy

manner of speaking.

He did not have a very large audience to-day, due perhaps more to the previous disappointment of most people to be able to get places where they could hear than to waning interest in the inquiry. When the Judge Advocate finished asking his questions, Mr. Rayner announced that would be no redirect examination and that he had only one or two witnesses to call. The Judge Advocate has a dozen or more witnesses in rebuttal. It is likely that the proceedings will last until the

More than thirty questions were asked the Court. They concerned mainly the retrograde movement, the Colon affair, and the matter of coaling. No questions were asked about the "loop" or the Hodgson correspondence, an indication that the Court has heard all the evidence it desires on those matters. Some of the Court's inquiries were very direct and searching. One of the most conspicuous of these was why Schley, if he thought the retrograde movement to westward was based on sound military principles, went back to Santiago. His answer was that, having coaled some of his ships, very Spanish fleet was not there. He did not explain, however, why he had gone back at all after having left in the confident belief that the Spanish squadron was not

Other questions related to Admiral Schley's failure to make any effort at Cienfuegos or Santiago, beyond sending in the neutral steamer, Adula, at the first-named port, to ascertain whether the Spanish feet was at those places; to the possibility and still having coal enough to reach Key West (and Admiral Schley admitted that it was possible), to the chance that Cervera could have escaped between Schley's account of the distance Schley steamed from shore (and Admiral Schley admitted that the enemy might have done it at night) to the risk that should have been taken in coaling off Santiago in view of the importance of the situation there; to the nversation between Admiral Schley and Capt. Cotton about coaling ships at Mole St. Nicholas, and to his reasons for directing his ships on May 31 to fire at the Colon if his only purpose was to develop the fortifications at Santiago.

To one question by the Court Admiral

Sohley said that his object in developing the Santiago batteries was to prepare for a possible attempt to force the harbor entrance. Another question was whether his orders did not require him to remain of Santiago, and Admiral Schley admitted that "possibly" they did, but he thought he had discretion in the matter. The such a despatch as that of May 27 to the Navy Department, explaining why he left Santiago, when on the stand he gave other motives that were not mentioned in the

In cross-examining Admiral Schley today Capt. Lemly confronted him with his atch to the Navy Department, saying that the affair of May 81 was principally to destroy the Colon. On the stand Admiral Schley has explained why he did not go the Colon by the statement that the affair was a reconnoissance to develop the batteries at Santiago His explanation of the telegram was that he had used the word "principally" inadvertently, and that "I will stand by that," apparently referring

He said that he did not know the range from the Colon was so great, and thought she was much nearer than she really was, and put the blame for the long range on (now Rear Admiral) Higginson of Massachusette and the navigator of his vessel, Lieutenant-Commander Potts, the officer who testified that Admiral Schley was nervous and appeared to be suffering under great mental excitement during the affair of May 31. The Judge Advocate wanted to know why, after seeing the Colon, Admiral Schley had waited two days before shooting at her, and the Admiral answered that he coaled in the meantime, so that if the reconnoissance made the Spanish ships come out he would be

prepared to meet them
Admiral Schley has stated on the stand that he had personal command of the Brooklyn. The Judge Advocate asked him to day how it was then that Capt. Cook gave the "loop" order. Admiral Schley answered that Cook did this under general instructions not to get within torpedo distance of the enemy, but the Admiral added that he assumed absolute responsibility for that manusers. He said also that he never beard until six months after the battle that the Texas had backed her engine to prevent being run down by the Breoklyn.

NEW REASON FOR THE LOOP Admiral Schley gave a new reason for in action and meet the enemy." This was perhaps the most important of all reasons, he explained, but he had nover given it before because he had considered it self-evident. "There are other reasons which might be conjured, "said the Admiral. The Judge Advocate, however, did not ask Admiral Schley to conjure up any more reasons, but confronted him with his statement to the Senate that the loop had been made to avoid blanketing the fire of the other American ships, and his statement on the stand that it had been made to prevent the Brooklyn from turning her broadside to possible torpedo attack

her broadside to possible torpedo attack by the enemy; and then ensued these ques-tions and answers: Q. Which of these various reasons did you have in mind at that time? A. Prob-

Q. Which of these various reasons did you have in mind at that time? A. Probably all of them and others.

Q. What I was getting to is which of these reasons did you have at the time when you approved of this turn with a port helm? A. Well, I say, probably all of them and more. I do not know that I can remember every one. The fact that it was successful seems to me—

"I beg your pardon," interrupted the Judge Advocate, "that is argument, and we do not want argument.

Very few questions were asked Admiral Schley by the Judge Advocate about the reported colloquy on the Brooklyn and the consequent correspondence with Lieut, tenant-Commander Hodgson. He denied again that there had been any colloquy, but admitted that Hodgson had said something about the Texas and that he (Schley) had seen her. He said he could not remember anything else about his conversation with Hodgson. In regard to his publication of Mr. Hodgson's letter denying that the collegent had occurred, while not multishanything else about his conversation with Hodgson. In regard to his publication of Mr. Hodgson's letter denying that the colloquy had occurred, while not publishing the accompanying letter from Hodgson admitting that the conversation between Schley and himself as printed in The Sun, was substantially correct, Admiral Schley made the remarkable explanation that the categorical denial had been given by him to the Washington Post because it was confirmatory of the accompanying letter.

You do not mean that the accompanying letter was confirmatory of the categorical letter?" asked the Judge Advocate, in a voice that expressed astonishment.

gorical letter?" asked the Judge Advocate, in a voice that expressed astonishment.
"Yes," was Admiral Schley's response.
Capt. Lemly wanted to know what Admiral Schley had done to place Mr. Hodgson right before the country, and got this answer: "I did not do anything, because the Department had ordered an investigation and that stopped me from doing anything."

SCHLET'S CROSS TAMINATION PROMISED.

SCHLEY'S CROSS-EXAMINATION RESUMED.

doing anything."

SCHLEY'S CROSS-EXAMINATION RESUMED.

"You are still under oath." said Admiral Dewey when Admiral Sobley took the stand as the court assembled. Judge Advocate Lemly resumed his cross-examination immediately, taking up the blockade of Santiago by the Flying Squadron.

By the Judge Advocate:

Q. Admiral, the lowa was not with you at Hampton Roads when you had the conference with the captains? A. No.

Q. Did you subsequently have any conference with her commander [Capt. Evans]? A. I think not. It was not until we got off Santiago that I had another conference.

Q. Did you impart to him at any time the verbal order of battle to which you have testified? A. The first time that I fell in with Capt. Evans he was disabled, and his executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Rodgers, acted for him. I don't remember whether I said anything to him or not about it. I didn't see Capt. Evans again until we got off Santiago. I talked a good deal with Mr. Rodgers, but don't recollect specially what was said.

Q. Can you state how the number of

a good deal with Mr. Rodgers, but don't recollect specially what was said.

Q. Can you state how the number of blockading vessels in your squadron prior to June 1 compared with those on the Wei-Hai-Wei blockade? [This question was based on testimony of Capt. William M. Folger, of the New Orleans, that he had advised Admiral Schiey to establish a circular blockade off Santiago such as the Japanese established at Wei-Hai-Wei.] A. No, I do not know that I can give that. I think, however, from the conversation with Capt. Folger, that the blockade to which he referred as circular in form contained a larger number of vessels than my squadron did, with the addition of two flanking squadrons, to the starboard and the port. The impression he left was that they had a great many more ships than I had.

CIRCULAR BLOCKADE.

Q. In a circular blockade, with the ves-sels pointing in toward the mouth of the harbor, are they not in a good position to turn readily and chase in either direc-

The Judge Advocate—Not at all. It is a general question based on the discussion between the Admiral and Capt. Folger with reference to the adoption of the circular blockade as suggested by Capt.

olger. Admiral Schley-I think that I stated in Admiral Schiey—I think that I stated in my direct testimony that a squadron arranged circularly about a port and charging toward centre will necessarily produce confusion and require additional arrangement provided the enemy can steam either east or west. That would necessitate another arrangement of plan entirely, It struck me, in talking over it, that there would be some confusion, which did actually happen later.

ally happen later.
The Judge Advocate—Have you stated in your examination in chief—regarding the conversation with Capt. Folger—that Folger on May 30 advised you to move in closer, and that on the very next day, although you did move in closer, he signalled to you that the battery would fire on the ship in the rosition he then held?

on the ship in the position he then held?

Admiral Schley—I possibly have made the mistake of a day. [After looking over the log.] I was mistaken in stating it as the next day. It was June 1. NO VESSEL TRIED TO PASS BLOCKADE. Q. You have stated that no vessel passed the blockade, either going in or coming out, at Cienfueges or Santiago, prior to June 1? A. I stated that that was my

conclusion.

Q. State whether or not, within your knowledge, any vessel attempted so to pass in or out, in the blockade of either of those ports? A. None that I know of. I conclude that largely from the fact that, wherever, a blockade municipal. I conclude that largely from the fact that, whenever a blockade running occurred, it was largely advertised. I remember specifically on the north coast a French commander who had succeeded in running into one of the ports, and it was advertised in all the newspapers as a very great accomplishment. I inferred, therefore, that if anything of the kind occurred in any of the ports south, an equal notoriety would be given to it; and, as I saw nothing of the kind, the conclusion was fair that pone

, the conclusion was fair that none had entered.
The Judge Advocate then began to interrogate the Admiral as to the affair of May 31. Admiral Schley referred to the telegram Admiral Schley referred to the telegram of May 29 to Capt Cotton, directing him to bold on at all hazards. The New York, Oregon and New Orleans are on the way: St. Louis and Yankee are leaving New York for Santiago via Nicholas Mole. He thought that that was all that was communicated to him on the subject, though it might be that Capt. Folger communicated with him.

Q. You had been off Santiago two days when you made this recommunicated.

Q. You had been off Saltings when you made this recontoissance, as you term it, had you not? A. Yes.
Q. Why did you wait two days before making any effort to coal? A. Simply because I availed myself of the opportunity on all occasions when it was possible, because I availed myself of the oppor-tunity, on all occasions when it was possible, in *holding on." I thought it was very much better to get my ships full of coal, in the event that the recommissance I in-tended should develop the fact that the enemy might come out. Q. You were still coaling on the Nist, were you not? A Yes, on part of the version.

vessels

Q. That was the part of the squadron that was not engaged in the bondbardment or reconnoiseance. A Yes, they were the Brooklyn, the Texas, and I think the

Marbiehend
Admiral Schley said he did not remember saying on May 20, as Lacut Sharps testsfeed. The Admiral [Sampson] will be here to-morrow," and that if he did say it, it was simply theidental

THE RECONNOISSANCE OF MAT 2: Asked to tell what conversations he had on the Massacinusetts after he went aboard that shap for the "recommissation," the Admiral said.
"I talked of a great many things with

they may have been important or not. I recollect his asking me if we would not defer the pending bombardment until after the men should have finished their dinner, which, of course, I agreed to. We went up on deck and went into a chart house where there was a conversation about the reconnoissance; and all that I can recall with any distinctness is that Capt. Higginson rather agreed that we were going to do about all that was necessary. I recollect the incident of calling people off the tower. I remember Mr. Potts told him that we were on the range, but beyond that I do not recall anything with any great distinctness or that anything naterial was talked about. I recollect at the same time directing a signal to be made to the New Orleans (the middle vessel of the three) to attack the batteries. I do not remember the signal, Don't go in any closer. three) to attack the batteries. I do not remember the signal, 'Don't go in any closer.' I do not recollect directing any signal of that sort at all, and I do not find any record of it, nor do I that any record of several signals that were made during the day of the battle. The only way I can account for that omission is that these signals were written up afterward and probably forgotten. Of course, a man in battle has not his pencil and paper out, except the press correspondents, and they

except the press correspondents, and they brave all dangers.

Q. I would like to ask you if that signal with regard to the New Orleans firing on the batteries is the only one that you say you cannot find? A. I cannot find it, but lare outs distinct in the same that you have the control of t you cannot find? A. I cannot find it, but I am quite distinct in my memory—that is, as reasonably distinct as one can be now—that I directed that, whether by flag or wig-wag I do not recall, because after giving the signal officer instructions I did not see that he carried them out.

Mr. Rayner—May I ask whether you have any record of signals from the Massachusetts?

sachusetts?
The Judge Advocate I do not know unless they are in the log of the Massa-

unless they are in the log of the massa-chusetts.

Admiral Schley (after looking at the log of the Massachusetts)—I see this entry in the log: At 1:30 this ship, with the New Orleans and Iowa, steamed in 8,000 yards, and at 10 knots, heading eastward, opened fire with the 13 and 8-inch guns on Cristobal Colon, New Orleans on the batteries. That would seem to bear out my recollection.

The Judge Advocate—I now want to invite your attention to page 422 of the Appendix, to the report of the Bureau of Navigation, and call attention especially to a signal at 11:20 A. M. from the Massachusetts (flagship) to the squadron. This, I will say, is a list of the signals appended to the report of the commanding officer of the lowa. I will read that signal: "The Massachusetts and the Naw Orleans and Iowa will go in after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at the Cristobal Colon with 8, 12 and 13-inch guns, speed about 10 with 8, 12 and 13-inch guns, speed about 10 knots." Do you recall that signal? A. I see it here, and as it is a matter of official record I must accept it. I think that is also in my signal book. I think, however, that would rather bear out the fact that signals were afterward made, because the

New Orleans had no 8, 12, and 13-inch guns.

Q. I do not think you will find that in your signal book. Will you look? A. It may not be in my signal book, but my impression now is that I had seen it there. After further examination.] No, I do not look in either of the official records. The Judge Advocate—It may be that the record was taken aboard the other ship. I want to invite attention now to another signal: '1:33 P. M. Brooklyn to squadron: Following Massachusetts. use heavy guns

signal: 1:33 P. M., Brooklyn to squarron.
Following Massachusetts, use heavy guns on Cristobal Colon." Do you remember that signal? A. I do not recollect it distinctly, except that I see it here.

The Judge Advocate—We think that word "Brooklyn" is an error there because the Brooklyn was not at that time actually the flagship.

ORDERED A RANGE OF 7,000 YARDS.

ORDERED A RANGE OF 7,000 YARDS.

Q. You ordered a range of 7,000 yards on that day, did you not? A. Yes.

Q. Was this range measured from the Colon or from the Morro? A. I really did not think at that time that the Colon was so far up the harbor as she subsequently proved to be. Of course, I left that entirely to the navigating officer and the Captain.

Q. Do you mean you left the measurement to them? A. Yes, of course, I did not measure the range. I remember that Mr. Potte spoke of our being on the range. And I simply then directed the Captain to carry out his instructions. They made a report to me, but it was after my telegram had gone, showing that the range was greater. My recollection is—and I am speaking from memory on that point—that Capt. Higginson in his official report said that it was 7,500 yards.

Q. Did your letter to the Senate of Feb.

that is the inference there.

Q Will you read what you said in your

Admiral Schley read what you said in your letter about the cautionary order?
Admiral Schley read as follows: On May 31, leaving the Brooklyn and Texas coaling in offing, I made a recomnoissance in afternoon with the Massachusetts, Iowa, New Orleans and Vixen to develop the enemy's position and incidentally to injure or destroy if possible the Colon moored well up in the hardor. The result of the reconnoissance determined without queson the presence of the Spanish fleet would have been unwise to risk until reenforced any chance of serious disablement of the ships that would have rendered
the squadron numerically inferior to the
enemy. This in my judgment was in
line with the judgment of the Navy Department set out on page 171 Appendix to Bureau's report in Secretary Long's instructions to Rear
Admiral Sampson in the words:
The Department does not wish the vessels
of your squadron to be exposed to the de Cuba or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the Depart-ment would suggest that a rigid blockade ment would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish this the destruction of the enemy's vessels—without subjecting unnecessarily our men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries;' and because the reason that lack of docking facilities made it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled. This was substantially retreated on April 26, 1888 vessels should not be crippled. This was substantially repeated on April 26, 1898 (page 177 'Appendix'), and May 5 (306 'Appendix'), as to not risking or crippling the vessels against fortifications. Q. Is that what you said? A. That is what I said. Q. You do not say there, do you, that

Q. You do not say there, do you, that you had knowledge at this time of the first of these orders which you have quoted from page 71—I mean to say at the time of the bombardment? A. No, I do not know that I did state that. There were a number of things in that letter that were not stated, as I evaluated the other day for stated, as I explained the other day.

cation a very few days. When I look over it now I am surprised that so few things were omitted. I did not have those communications in my possession, but I had the information of them.

O The information of all or only one? A My recollection is, as I said the other day, that it was only that the Adiputal spoke of the bombardment of these places being interdicted That was his confidential instruction.

O You mention there there orders, do you not? A I mention those because I and them in the "Appendix" But if you will go on a little further, that is, beyond the let of June, it will be found that the Department was extremely solicitous to inpartment was extremely solicitous to in-terdict the exposure of battleships in the attack upon Santiago de Cuba, I think as tale as July 10. I am pretty sure that

in this volume.

Q Unconditionally? A Perhaps I had etter look at it.

Mr. Rayner Do you think that is at all material, what happened as late as July

The Judge Advocate - We do not think as toution be taid was what he received from the Commander-in-Chief.

The Witnesse I rained put my hand upon

the here
y it, it
such the destruction to aperation technic
Santings after the destruction of the free.
Yes, I was right; it was as lete as duly in
(page 505 "Appendix") "The communiting
Commond of the army urges and Secretary
of War argently requests that many force
sconfer with communities of the army.
Wishing to do all fight is reasonably pass
with turelly.
I have the matter to your discretain, except

that the Unized States armored vessels must not be risked."

Q. But thit was after the destruction of the fleet, was at not? A. It was after the destruction of the fleet.

THE BROOKLYN'S TURN. Q. What was the first movement the Brooklyn made with her helm on the day of the action? A. To port, and afterward it was put hard aport by Capt. Cook.

Q. You did not say at first whether "hard aport" or simply "aport." A. When I asked him, "Is your helm hard aport?" his reply was either "aport" or "hard aport," but from the way that the ship was swinging at that time I assumed that it was "hard aport," because she went around rather rapidly.

aport," because she went around rather rapidly.

Q. You regard this as a very important manouvre, don't you? A. Yes. I think it was the movement that decided the result

Q. Did you mention this manceuvre in your report of the battle? A. No: I did not know that it was going to be a matter of question. It struck me that as it was a mere incident in the battle it could never be questioned.

Q. But you regard it as an important that the property of the property is a superfect.

regard it as very important.
Q. If I understand you correctly, Capt.

of it, the Brooklyn had to take the very important lead, and if we had eacrificed her we might have lost the battle.

Q. What indication did you give to the other vessels of the fleet to show the direction in which the Brooklyn was going to turn or was turning? A I did not give any, because I did not think we were in any dangerous proximity to them. But after we turned, the signal was made to follow the flag and they followed it.

Q. That was after the turn, that is in evidence. But my question relates to the time before the turn. Now I want to ask if your first signal, in the action of July 3, was not to the westward division only? A. Probably, yes. It was to clear ship for action.

for action.

Q Does your report of the battle show that? A. I think I so stated, yes.

"POLLOW-THE-PLAG" SIGNAL.

POLLOW-THE-PLAG SIONAL.

Q. Where, heretofore, before this inquiry, have you mentioned the signal Follow the flag, that was made July 3? A. I think I have kept my mouth shut pretty close about all such things.

Q. Where is there, in the record, any written statement? A. I do not know that there is. As I said before, there were quite a number of these signals that, in the hurry of battle, escaped record.

Q. But you made no record of this particular signal? A. I know of no record of it. I recollect giving it, and it was flying for twenty minutes, and the signal halliard that bere it was shot.

it. I recollect giving it, and it was flying for twenty minutes, and the signal halliard that here it was shot.

Q. Did the Brooklyn, on the occasion of Q. Did the Brooklyn, on the occasion of Q. There has been some testimony before the court in regard to the preparations for training, on board the Brooklyn, on the occasion of Lyn. A. I recollect saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively and which was rejected.

The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to sink the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to say the form of the saying to Capt. Cook, The Judge Advocate—I have no objectively interest to say the form of the say the s

Q. Did the Brooklyn, on the occasion of the battle, stand in and attempt to sink the Spardsh fleet in the channel? A. I think she obeyed orders.

Q. I want an answer to that question. A Yes. I started in, at first, of course, to help the others as much as possible and to have them help me. But my idea was, seeing the direction in which they were going, that if we could confuse these people our battleships could sink them. I had no idea that they would escape.

Q. How close in did the Brooklyn go to the harbor? A. From the time the battle opened, which was it the neighborhood of 9.35, she was going at the rate of about twelve knots an hour, so that the first five minutes would have brought the neighborhood of 19.35, she was going at the rate of about twelve whole an hour, so that the first five minutes would have brought the enemy's vessels about a mile out, which would have left about 2,000 yards between the two squadrons. I should say that the street of the same time I told him to "look out for the torpedo boats." I heard firm direct Mr. Mason to detail one or two guns of one of the batteries to look out for them.

Q. I was referring more particularly to an order that was supposed to have been given to "prepare to ram." Do you know about that order? A. I do not recollect whether we gave the order "prepare to warm" or to stand by to ram."

The fact that the order reached below was evidence to me that he adve the order. At the same time I told him to "look out for the torpedo boats." I heard him direct Mr. Mason to detail one or two guns of one of the batteries to look out for them.

Q. I was referring more particularly to an order that was supposed to have been given to "prepare to ram." Do you know about that order? A. I do not recollect whether we gave the order "prepare to warm" or to "stand by to ram."

The Judge Advocate—It would be a mere matter of words. I did not pretend to quote. But they mean practically the same the day of the matter of words. I did not pretend to quote. But they mean practically the the two squadrons. I should say that she continued twelve to fourteen minutes probably—that is a mercestimate—I did not pull out my watch and take the time, but I

should say that we got--BROOKLYN'S DISTANCE PROM HARBOR O. Within what distance from the mouth

Q. Within what distance from the mouth of the harbor? A. I should say that we certainly got within a mile and a half, probably. I did not attempt to measure exactly. The only way I have is to estimate by the speed of the squadron.

Q. I have not heard your final estimate?

A. I should say from a mile to a mile and a half. It looked very close to me. I remember distinctly the fact of the range being 1,100 yards some moments before being 1,100 yards some moments before the ship turned. The second ship of the squadron impressed me as being closer than the others, because I remember this distinct feature of those men running from the turret to the superstructure and between their legs I could see daylight with my

their legs I could see daylight with my naked eye.

Q. And they were how far off then?

A. I should say certainly over 1,000 yards.

Q. That was when you saw daylight between their legs, when they were running? A. Yes. Of course there was a perfectly clear background behind them

Q. When the Spanish squadron succeeded in getting out of the harbor of Santiago, was there anything for you to do but tiago, was there anything for you to do but chase them? A. Well, no, I suppose not, nothing to do but to chase them. But to

Pimples Vanish

when Carlshad Sprudel Salt is taken. It freshens the skin wonderfully, clears the system, and purifies the blood. Carlsbad Sprudel Salt is a positive cure for constipation, disordered stomach, biliousness, dyspepsia, etc.

Carlsbad Sprudel Salt is obtained by evaporation

from the waters of the Springs in Carlshad, and contains the same remarkable curative properties that have made the place famous for five centuries MENTALISMS TO Sale Agents. New York on bottle. He ware of chase them in a proper effective way was one thing, and to merely chase them was another.

Q. There was nothing else to do but to chase them at that time, was there?

A. That is the case in any battle, when records start to run.

A. That is the case in any battle, when people start to run
Q. That was the case in this battle, wasn't it? A. Yes.
Q. Within your knowledge, was there any vessel present not necessarily engaged with the Spanish torpedo boat destroyers which failed to so chase? If so, what vessel? A. I think there were several that did not chase because they could not.
Q. That would not fall within the scope of the question. A. I am not able to answer that.
Q. You know of no vessel that failed?
A. I do not know of any. There was not any one that could keep up with the Oregon and the Brooklyn.

SCHLEY'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE.

The Judge Advocate—I want to ask you to look at your report of the battle, printed in the Appendix, page 519. in the Appendix, page 519.

Mr. Rayner—I do not think that has been given in evidence. We ask that that be

tion of the witness to this paragraph:

Since reaching this place and holding con-

or much the subject of controversy, I now regard it as very important.

The Judge Advocate directed the attention of the witness containing you, the Commander-in-Chief.

Cook, who was in command of the slipp, gave the order for this movement without consulting you, the Commander-in-Chief.

A Only under his general instructions. Upon going in I told him what I wanted him told.

What was that? A That was the signal that was hoisted for "Close action," or "Close up," and that meant to keep somewhere about 1,000 yards distances as to be outside of torpedo range.

Q Then the "port the helm" or "hard aport" had no reference to keeping in close, had it? A That was to turn on the was the south. The ship had approached, as Capt Cook thought, within the instructions given. His conception of the movement that was proper at that time accorded precisely with my own, because I should have given the order in a second if he had not.

TAKES RESPONSIBILITY OF LOOP.

Q That being a very important tactical maneutyre, and you being the senior officer, do you consider that the full responsibility for that maneutyre rests uponyou? A. Absolutely. Even if I did not give the order, I approved it after it was given.

Q I assume that any order given would have been given by signal. Was any such signal ordered or given from the Brooklyn to the other vessels of the squadron as as to secure uniformity of action? A. They had made their turn, and it was because of the possibility of getting to their cross fire that the turn of the Brooklyn of the study was made.

Q Was that the purpose of the loop? A Not entirely, it was one of the reasons to avoid that at the crucial time of the battle, when the fire of our battleships was so absolutely important. The movement of the possibility of getting to their consense of the possibility of getting to their cross fire that the fire of our battleships was so absolutely important. The movement of the proposed were the battle, when the fire of our battleships was so absolutely important. The movement of the

Q. You have stated in your letter of July 12, 1990, that when your helm was put hard aport you were within 1,000 yards of the Viscaya, is that correct? A. I judged it was about that; that was my estimation.
Q. The Texas, the Iowa and the Oregon

Q. The Texas, the lowa and the Oregon all report a range of 2,000 yards or about that at that time? A. Yes.
Q. These conditions are not consistent, are they? A. I don't know what they reported. I only know what we measured.
Q. How did you measure? A. By stadiometer.

Q. How did you measure? A. By stadiometer.
Q. Could you not tell by the way the Texas was turned whether she was using one engine or not? A. We were too far away for me to notice a detail of that kind. I never heard of the Texas incident for six months after the battle had been concluded:

PREPARATIONS FOR RAMMING.

Admiral Schley-No, I don't think so.
Q. "Stand by to ram" or "stand by

Admiral Schley—No, I don't think so.

Q. "Stand by to ram" or "stand by for ramming?" A. I think it was "stand by for ramming." That might be susceptible of two interpretations.

Q. When was this, as nearly as you can recollect? A. It was some moments before I made the turn, or the loop, perhaps I ought to designate it.

Q. Perhaps the difference is not material between the two words. It has been stated by witnesses for the applicant that the Viscaya appeared to intend to ram after the Brooklyn turned and just before the Viscaya went ashore? A. That was the second attempt.

Q. Do you know who gave the order to "Stand by to ram?" A. I do not really Q. Do you know stand by to ram?

"Stand by to ram?" A I do not really recollect. I suppose it was the captain. I was in constant communication with him. I had no conversation with an body else

during the battle, except with the captain and to give him directions.

Capt. Lemly—I am going to read this and see if you remember it. [Capt. Lemly then read a letter from Admiral Schley dated June 30, 1900, in which he said that in his judgment the Viscaya was not more han a thousand yards distant and the Brook

and of search are research fractions of the control of the temporary for the remove that it would be ve control to into a chargerous proximity to the tropode attack. It is the terestrictly to the tropode attack. It is control to the regard A Yea that was one of the reasons for the turn. Then the Judge Advance precisional tester. It was from Admired Series to the Navy Department, these Montred Series without June 18, 1900. Asked whether he

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That's All!

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had written it, Admiral Schley replied: "Yes, I wrote this letter in compliance with Circular Orders 505 and 543, in which

officers were directed to submit any additional information.

The Judge Advocate—Here are three reasons given for making the turn. I want to know what your reason was for making that turn to the southward.

Admiral Schley—As I stated in my direct testimony, I had another and more important reason which I have not been asked about

about.
The Judge Advocate—What was that?
Admiral Schley—That the ships might
continue in the action and beat the enemy.
That was the controlling one
The Judge Advocate—Have you stated

Admiral Schley-No, I thought that that was very evident.
The Judge Advocate—And you never have stated it?
Admiral Schley—There are some other

count. If you can account, for the distance run by the Brooklyn on July 3."

Admiral Schley—There are some other reasons perhaps which I might conjure up. The Judge Advocate—And then in your rained. I stated in reference to the Scanic document that the matter was somewhat hurned. I stated, however, the general purposes of the movement and how it was accomplished. The Judge Advocate—Which of these various reasons did you have it your mind at the time that you approved of this turn with the port helm?

Admiral Schley—Probably all of them and others. I do not know that I can recollect them all, excepting the fact that the turn was successful.

The Judge Advocate—I beg your pardon. That is argument instead of facts.

Mr. Rayner—He was a letter real that the record and show that he had in his mind. There is no specification here about what he had in his mind. The question is, What did he do?

The Judge Advocate—And the further question is, What was his reason for doing it? In the direat examination he was asked a great number of times what was his reason and nobody on this side made an objection.

Mr. Rayner—Inever asked the question.

The Judge Advocate—I will refer you to the record and show that you are wrong in so many other instances. Laughter.

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The Judge Advocate—I will refer you to the record and show that you are wrong in so many other instances. Laughter.

Admiral Schley—I will read to you the first two paragraphs of your letter of July 6, 1898 [in report of engagement with Span-ish squadron].

cluded.

Q. When were you able to determine by the way the Brooklyn turned, whether one engine was backing or not? A. I was always under the impression, as I stated the other day, merely from the churning of the water I saw, that her starboard engine was backing, and it was some time before I found out that was not a matter of record. There was every evidence of that under her stern, and I had it formerly in my mind, but that problems was one of the errors which we sometimes make.

BATTLE.

admiral Schley—It was sent and was redespatch was received by you?
would be difficult to state

Capt. Parker—We will offer it now.
The Judge Advocate—Not now. I insist upon my right to continue the cross-

Dewey suggested that the facts in the preliminary report might be drawn out in
some other way.

Mr. Rayner—This preliminary report
of the battle was sent to Admiral Sampson
and was received by him.

Admiral Dewey—That is different.

Mr. Rayner—It never has been introduced in evidence at all Admiral Schley
has said that he can explain his report now
by reference to a preliminary report of the
battle which he made to Admiral Sampson
and I am sure there can be no objection to
that.

hat. The Judge Advocate. I object to its coming in at this time and interrupting my cross-examination.

Admiral Dewey—The Admiral has a right to refresh his memory by reading his

The Judge Advocate There is no objec-The Judge Advocate—There is no objection to the report, but my objection is to interference with the cross-examination. It is an interference with the cross-examination of the witness and it is for the express purpose of interference.

"My dear sir," said Mr. Rayner. "I have interfered with you less that I have ever interfered with the examination of a witness. I have stood here for three days and my patience is almost give."

Admiral Dewey—If there is no objection to bringing it in at another time, why not bring it in now.

Schley! Was that letter sent? Don't answer, Admiral, until we hear from the other side."
"We object to that, if it please the court,"
said Mr. Hanna, the Judge Advocate's as-

"Well, if I can't ask that I can't find out

"Well, if I can't ask that I can't find out if it was sent," said Mr. Rayner.
"We don't know if it was sent," remarked Admiral Dowey. "It is marked 'not sent." We don't want it."

Mr. Rayner would not give up. "Who made that mark on it that it was not sent?" he asked Admiral Schley.

"My secretary," was the answer.
"If the Court please," Capt Lemiy said, "I'd like to proceed with my examination." Admiral Schley then read the letter, but not aloud, to refresh his memory, and

in this instance as you have been wrong in so many other instances. [Laughter.] [To Admiral Schley I will road to you the first two paragraphs of your letter of duly 6.1898 [in report of engagement with Spanish squadron].

He read the paragraph ending "the concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them, and he asked: "Is that correct?"

"Yes." Admiral Schley replied, "that is correct."

The Judge Advocate read an extract from the next paragraph as follows "Observing that she [the Colon] had struck her colors and that several vossels were reason. I would like to add that this present she would have done as good work as any of us. I said is referred to your command all through in complimentary terms. That was the reason. I would like to add that this presiminary report was directed to the Consumer the other sattleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another wossel which proved to be your [Admiral Sampsson's] flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which had run close and the content of the Colon, which had run close and the content of the Colon, which had run close and sattleships, evaluately assert and the down out of sight or obscured at your definition.

The Judge Advocate Were not the Indiana, the Texas, the Gloucester and the lowa out of sight or obscured at your definition after the movement toward the harbor mouth had been commenced?

son's! flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which had run close inshore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to clude her pursuers." Do you find that also?

SCHLEY'S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE BATTLE.

Admiral Schley—Yes, and I can explain the whole thing if you permit me to intro-

THE HODGSON INCIDENT The Judge Advocates—Not now. I insist upon my right to continue the cross-examination.

Admiral Dewey—The information contained in the preliminary report may be thrown out, the court thinks. A great many questions have been asked and you may ask them all.

Mr. Rayner remarked that three days had been used in cross-examining Admiral Schley and that now he wanted to have the preliminary report read. Admiral Dewey suggested that the facts in the preliminary report might be drawn out in some other way.

Mr. Rayner—This preliminary report to continue the cross-examination about the Hodgson incident. This is Schley's testimony on cross-examination about the Hodgson incident. This is Schley's testimony on cross-examination about the Hodgson incident. This is Schley's testimony on cross-examination about the Hodgson incident. The Judge Advocate State as nearly as you can what was said by you and been asked and you may ask them all.

Admiral Schley's testimony on cross-examination about the Hodgson incident. The Judge Advocate State as nearly as you can what was said by you and blear Hodgson on board the Brockiyn just before. Admiral Schley I do not recall a single worl of conversation with Lieut Hodgson. Admiral Schley I do not recall a single worl of conversation with Lieut Hodgson in board the Brockiyn just before, and at the leganning of the loop.

Admiral Schley I do not recall a single worl of conversation with Lieut Hodgson in board the Brockiyn just before, and at the leganning of the loop.

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Admiral Schley I do not recall a single worl of conversation with Lieut Hodgson in board the Brockiyn just before, and at the leganning of the loop.

Admiral Schley I do not

> whether you gave out for publication Loor Hodgson's letter of June 11, 1899, a cate gerical denial of alleged colloquy in whole in part.
> Admiral Schley-Yes, I gave the whole ter to the Washington Post The Judge Advocate read the letter, stating that the colloque published in THE NEW YORK SUN never occurred and

and 10, 1899, declare as one of your objects in bringing the statement your desire in set him right before the country as well as yourself.

as yourself.
Admiral Schley - Eractly
The Judge Advocage Seri she you not
then publish his letter of denial without the accompanied explanation
Admiral Schley Unquestionably, yet
principally because the accompanied letter

ones of the judgment the viscaya was not more than a thousand yards distant and the Brook. A first a thousand yards distant and the Brook at the property of the property of the property of the property of the Bodgson correspondence, ist not?

Q. No it is not. Now this shows that your movement with a prort bein was to prevent your being rammed by the Viscaya, at well, I thank so. I would like to look at that record.

Capt. Lendy—Now, if you will sit down, we will produce it. The Court understands that it has been temporarily mislaid. [Wails a search was better made for the document Capt. Lendy—Now, if you will sit down, we will produce it. The Court understands that it has been temporarily mislaid. [Wails a search was better made for the document Capt. Lendy—Now, if you will sit down, we will such that the best produced to Schiely 1 first Sex reporters was not not like your articulant to your report. The court makes the court work of the flagship New York or articulant to your report. The court makes the court work of the flagship New York in produce it. The flagship will be such as held in the meantime. A No. I don't think I down the produce the flagship New York in the produce that the court work is not report. The flags of the flagship New York in the produce that the court work is not report. The flags of the flagship New York in the produce the flagship New York in the flagship New York in the produce that the court was the flags of the flagship New York in the produce of the flags

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